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Author: contact@thatfw.com

Gas Supply: The Great Liberalization?

Article published by Gilles Robert-Nicoud, attorney at law, on November 10, 2025.

On September 19, 2025, the Federal Council launched a consultation on a new draft federal law on gas supply (LApGaz), which takes into account the criticisms made of the first draft. It is worth recalling that ComCo opened the gas market in principle in June 2020.

The law provides for a single balancing zone equivalent to the Swiss market zone, the establishment of an independent market zone operator (who will not own the transmission network), and a Federal Energy Commission (EnCom, the current ElCom whose duties will be expanded). Negotiated network access will be replaced by regulated access under the supervision of EnCom.

All end consumers, regardless of consumption volume, will have free choice of supplier. Network usage fees will be based on attributable costs plus an appropriate profit margin (WACC).

Given Switzerland’s climate objectives, network development plans must be primarily focused on decarbonization, which could lead to the decommissioning of networks in favor of district heating (CAD). These costs (extraordinary depreciation and dismantling costs) are to be borne by end consumers. The Federal Council suggests paying particular attention to informing consumers, coordinating with the development of CAD, and distributing costs over a reasonable number of clients. The risk is that dismantling costs may be borne by consumers who have no immediate alternative to gas supply.

A potential contradiction lies in giving end consumers the freedom to choose their gas supplier (while networks are gradually being decommissioned) and at the same time keeping them in a monopoly of CAD, which is not regulated and solely under the Price Supervisor’s authority. The Confederation has little authority in the area of heat networks. Ideally, LApGaz should therefore be accompanied by regulation of thermal networks, which is not currently planned.

Sealing Procedure – General Principles and the Case of the Smartphone

A summary prepared by Alexandre Reymond, attorney-at-law

The seizure and search of documents, a computer or a telephone are common in criminal proceedings. Since a mobile phone is an immense source of information, the criminal authorities (generally the public prosecutor) often decide to seize it and search it. The result of this search will be included in the investigation file and will be accessible to all parties, such as all defendants and complainants; it may also be placed on record in other files relating to other investigations. However, the defendant, or any entitled person, may preserve certain secrets through the sealing procedure, subject to certain conditions. The case law of the Federal Supreme Court provides guidance on the procedural obligations of the person requesting sealing and the scope of the grounds that may be invoked.

I. The sealing procedure

The purpose of sealing is to remove documents from the public prosecutor’s reach when there is a reason to keep them confidential. The person whose documents or objects have been seized by the investigators has a period of three days to request sealing. The criminal authority then has a period of twenty days to refer the matter to the judge (generally the Compulsory Measures Court) and request the lifting of the seals. The judge rules quickly and gives the person who requested the seals a single period of ten days to state their position on the lifting of the seals. The judge may be assisted by an expert to examine the documents, recordings or objects under seal.

The person requesting the sealing of documents or objects must make it plausible that they have grounds to seek the sequestration. The criminal authority must affix the seals immediately. It is not allowed to make a copy of the documents, to unlock the telephone or to make a mirror copy. If a copy or unlocking is necessary, it is the court that must do so, possibly by appointing a specialized entity. The Federal Supreme Court has excluded that this task be carried out by the investigating authority (ATF 148 IV 221).

Holders of seized objects and documents who oppose their search must set out the grounds invoked in a substantiated manner at the latest during the judicial procedure for lifting the seals, provided that a request for sealing that complies with form and time limits has been filed and that a request to lift the seals has been lodged.

In principle, the public prosecutor may not reject the request for sealing; it must affix the seals and, where applicable, request their lifting from the competent judge. The Federal Supreme Court nevertheless accepts that the public prosecutor may reject the sealing request where it is manifestly abusive, ill-founded or late (TF, arrêt 7B_313/2024 du 24 septembre 2024).

The risk that the public prosecutor may reject the sealing request requires the applicant to explain immediately the reason for the request and to demonstrate that it is not late. If necessary, they may complete their request when the judge gives them the opportunity to state their position on the lifting of the seals (art. 248a al. 3 CPP).

Applicants requesting sealing must assist the Compulsory Measures Court in reviewing and sorting the documents. They must demonstrate the existence of a secret and the overriding interest in maintaining that secret by identifying the documents concerned. This is all the more true because the judge responsible for lifting the seals does not know the details of the investigation and the public prosecutor cannot yet examine the sealed files. The persons concerned must also identify the items which, in their view, are subject to secrecy or which are manifestly unrelated to the criminal investigation so as to allow the court to separate the documents covered by secrecy from the other documents. This applies in particular where they have requested the sealing of very voluminous or complex documents or files (ATF 138 IV 225).

With regard to a smartphone or a computer, it is necessary to indicate to the judge where and how the documents covered by secrecy or relating to the private sphere are stored. In order to reach a decision, the judge examines all the documents and recordings subject to sealing. However, the judge may rely on an expert. This is particularly indicated to assist the judge in sorting the contents of a telephone.

The decision of the Compulsory Measures Court is final (art. 248a al. 4 CPP). A further appeal may, however, be lodged with the Federal Supreme Court provided the appellant demonstrates the existence of irreparable harm.

II. Grounds for ordering sealing

Since the amendment to the Code of Criminal Procedure that entered into force in 2024, the grounds that may be invoked to request sealing are exhaustively listed by law. Sealing may be requested for:

  • documents concerning contacts between the defendant and their defence counsel;
  • the defendant’s personal documents and correspondence, where the interest in the protection of personality outweighs the interest in criminal prosecution;
  • objects and documents concerning contacts between another person and their lawyer;
  • objects and documents concerning contacts between the defendant and a person who has the right to refuse to testify under arts. 170 to 173 CPP; these persons are essentially those subject to official secrecy and professional secrecy or who are covered by the protection of sources for media professionals.

Professional secrecy applies in particular to clergy, lawyers, defence counsel, notaries, patent advisors, physicians, dentists, chiropractors, pharmacists, psychologists, nurses, physiotherapists, occupational therapists, midwives, dieticians, optometrists, osteopaths, as well as their auxiliaries.

It is important to note that other secrets, such as trade secrets and banking secrecy, do not allow the request for sealing (TF, 7B_950/2024 du 15 novembre 2024). Where a ground for sealing is plausibly invoked, the legality of the search may also be challenged, but only on an ancillary basis (TF, 7B_950/2024 du 15 novembre 2024).

It is common for the public prosecutor to seize a telephone and order it to be searched. In such a case, the entitled person may invoke the aforementioned grounds, for example where the mobile phone contains medical documents or correspondence with their lawyer. As regards the telephone, they will generally be able to invoke confidentiality over their personal documents and correspondence. This ground concerns the protection of the private sphere, guaranteed by the Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights.

The Federal Supreme Court accepts that it is a matter of common knowledge that smartphones used privately generally contain a multitude of sensitive data relating to the intimate sphere of their owner and that it can therefore be assumed without further ado that a (complete) search of privately used smartphones infringes personal notes and correspondence (TF, 7B_145/2025 du 25 mars 2025).

However, unlike the other grounds permitting sealing, the protection of the private sphere is not absolute and depends on a balancing of interests between the interest in the protection of personality and the interest in criminal prosecution. The party requesting sealing must therefore demonstrate that their interest in the protection of their personality could outweigh the interest in criminal prosecution. In any event, the Federal Supreme Court considers that a general reference to private correspondence or photos is not sufficient (TF, 7B_145/2025 du 25 mars 2025).

The duty to cooperate in sorting does not mean that the defendant is obliged to provide their access codes and passwords.

III. Conclusions

Anyone faced with the seizure and search of their telephone is not without means to protect fundamental rights and certain secrets. In addition to the fact that all coercive measures must comply with fundamental principles such as proportionality and the existence of sufficient suspicions (art. 197 CPP), the holder may invoke the existence of a secret protected by law as well as respect for private life.

Anyone requesting the sealing of documents or a smartphone must ensure that the request is filed within three days. If compliance with this time limit is likely to be disputed, they should also explain why the request is not late.

Next, the person making the request must also indicate which ground(s) are invoked. On that occasion, they must also specify which documents those grounds apply to. When invoking respect for the private sphere, they must indicate why the protection of their private interest in secrecy should prevail over the interest in criminal prosecution.

Finally, if the public prosecutor requests the lifting of the seals, the holder must cooperate in the sorting of documents to be carried out by the judge.

Needless to say, the assistance of a lawyer in this technical procedure is recommended and increases the chances of removing from the criminal authority those documents protected by professional secrecy or relating to the private or intimate sphere.


Unofficial English translation – for information purposes only.

Gender Balance in the Boards of Listed Companies in Luxembourg : Setting a Quantitative Objective

Author: Céline LELIEVRE

Directive (EU) 2022/2381 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 November 2022 on improving the gender balance among directors of listed companies[1] introduced a quantitative target regarding gender balance on the boards of such companies. The bill transposing this directive into Luxembourgish law was submitted to the Chamber of Deputies on 28 March 2025[2].

The bill provides that companies whose shares are admitted to trading on a regulated market in one or more EU Member States and which have their registered office in Luxembourg must ensure that, by 30 June 2026 at the latest, at least 33% of all board positions, both executive and non-executive, are held by members of the underrepresented sex.

If there is a debate about the number of board seats required to meet the target, the bill states that the closest whole number to 33% should be used, without exceeding 49%. For instance, if a board has five members, two should be from the underrepresented gender—equating to 40% of the board.

The bill also stipulates that companies must select candidates based on a comparative assessment of qualifications, with selection criteria defined in advance. The text specifies:

“Where candidates are equally qualified in terms of suitability, competence and professional performance, priority shall be given to the candidate of the underrepresented sex, unless, in exceptional cases, overriding reasons having legal precedence—such as the pursuit of other diversity policies—objectively assessed and based on non-discriminatory criteria, tilt the decision in favor of the other candidate.”

Therefore, if a rejected candidate of the underrepresented sex demonstrates in court that they had equivalent qualifications to the selected candidate of the opposite sex, the listed company must prove there was no breach of the rule.

Only large listed companies are subject to this legislation. Micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)—defined as companies with fewer than 250 employees and an annual turnover not exceeding €50 million or an annual balance sheet total not exceeding €43 million[3]—are excluded.

The explanatory memorandum notes that improving gender representation at board level could have a broader impact—attracting female talent, increasing female leadership across all levels, and helping reduce employment and pay gaps between men and women[4].

According to the bill, the economic significance and high visibility of these companies make them particularly effective platforms for promoting gender equality.

References

  1. Directive (EU) 2022/2381 of 23 November 2022 on improving the gender balance among directors of listed companies and related measures.
    Official text
  2. Luxembourg bill No. 8372 submitted on 28 March 2025 to the Chamber of Deputies.
    www.chd.lu
  3. Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).
  4. Impact assessment accompanying the Commission’s proposal for Directive COM(2021) 930 final.

Chronic Absenteeism

Chronic Absenteeism: An Overview with Céline Lelièvre

What protection is granted to employees who are on long-term incapacity leave? What are the rights and obligations of the employer? Provided that the employee complies with their obligation to inform the employer, including during extensions of sick leave, the employer is not authorized, even for serious cause, to terminate the employment contract within 26 weeks from the onset of the incapacity for work. The employee is protected during this 26-week period.

First, it is important to note that protection against dismissal is set for a period of 26 weeks, and any interruption of this period—whether due to a return to work or recreational leave—triggers a new 26-week protection period. However, exceeding this 26-week threshold does not automatically entitle the employer to terminate the employment relationship. So what can be done when an employee remains continuously unfit for work beyond this 26-week limit?

The Luxembourg Court of Appeal, in a decision dated 13 February 2025[1], has reiterated the applicable framework for cases of chronic absenteeism.

In this case, an employee had been absent continuously due to illness for six months. Still unfit for work after the 26-week period granting legal protection against dismissal had expired, the employee was dismissed with notice.

The employee challenged the dismissal, arguing that the absences were due to “professional psychological exhaustion”, that he had repeatedly complained about deteriorating working conditions, and that his supervisor was aware of the situation. Moreover, he claimed that the repeated and prolonged absences over six months were fully covered by medical certificates, duly issued by a psychiatrist, due to burnout caused by excessive stress imposed by his former employer. He thus argued that his incapacity was directly causally linked to the performance of his employment contract. The employer, on the other hand, argued that the prolonged absence had impaired the proper functioning of the company.

The Court reiterated that chronic absenteeism is considered a legitimate reason for dismissal with notice, as long as the absences cited by the employer harmed the company’s operations and the employer did not have reliable information to believe they could count on the future presence and availability of the employee. The Court also held that a chronic absence of six months exceeds the normal operational risks that an employer is expected to bear, adding that, according to established case law, a continuous absence of six months is presumed to affect the proper functioning of the company in question.

According to the Court, this presumption applies regardless of the cause of the absences—unless the absences directly result from a workplace accident or a disease contracted due to work. There is thus a limit to this presumption: the employer cannot dismiss an employee for chronic absenteeism if the incapacity results from the performance of the employment contract. However, it is then up to the employee, who is contesting the dismissal, to prove that their chronic illness, lasting more than 26 weeks, is the direct result of a work accident or occupational disease and to demonstrate the causal link between their incapacity and the performance of their contract.

In this case, the Court, echoing the first judges’ analysis, held that the mere fact that the incapacity certificates were issued by a psychiatrist was not sufficient to establish a causal link between the employee’s incapacity and their work, since such psychiatric disorders can have multiple personal, family, or social causes, unrelated to the working conditions of the dismissed employee.

It is worth noting that in this case, the employer denied any link between the prolonged absence and the employee’s working conditions, demonstrating that the employee had “always strictly adhered to the contractually agreed working hours” and had worked overtime only “very rarely”.

Since the employee failed to establish a direct link between the cause of his absenteeism and the performance of his contract, the Court held that his continuous absence was presumed to impair the proper functioning of the company, and that the employer’s lack of reliable information during this extended period—information that might have allowed them to believe they could rely on the employee’s future availability—further supported this presumption.

The dismissal was therefore declared valid.

[1] Judgment No. 19/25 – III- TRAV – Case No. CAL-2023-00600

Maître Céline Lelièvre joins our firm as Partner

We are pleased to announce that Maître Céline LELIEVRE has joined our firm as a Partner.

Her arrival reflects our ongoing commitment to broadening our areas of expertise and marks a new step in our dedication to providing clients with high-quality legal services and tailored support.

Maître Lelièvre studied in France (Nancy) before joining the University of Luxembourg, where she completed her bar examinations. A qualified lawyer at the Court, she has been a member of the Luxembourg Bar since 2001 and has also been admitted to the Vaud Bar Association since 2015.

With her extensive experience, Maître Lelièvre will advise and represent our clients with precision, professionalism, and dedication. Her arrival notably strengthens our capabilities in corporate law, employment law (including matters related to the coordination framework of social security systems), public procurement, and all general contractual matters. She supports and advises clients not only in the context of their business activities (contracts, terms and conditions, tenders, acquisitions, restructuring, debt recovery, etc.) but also in all matters related to employee management (employment contracts, amendments, work permits, terminations, etc.).

Maître Lelièvre offers her legal services to businesses, institutions, and individuals, providing support in both advisory and litigation matters.

With a pragmatic approach and attentive listening skills, she is trained in alternative dispute resolution methods such as mediation, collaborative law, and principled negotiation. This enables her to develop strategies tailored to the specific needs of each client.

Before joining our firm, Maître Lelièvre began her legal career in Luxembourg, where she continues to practice. In 2015, she joined a firm in Lausanne specializing in corporate law.

We warmly welcome her and are confident that her dynamism and expertise will be valuable assets to our team and clients.

secret professionel

The Revised Swiss Civil Procedure Code

Extending Legal Privilege to In-House Counsel

Status update with Anthony Braham.

On 1 January 2025, a significant amendment to the Swiss Civil Procedure Code (CPC) came into effect, granting in-house counsel the same level of protection for secrecy as outside counsel—a protection that has been notably absent in Swiss law until now. This development marks a crucial shift in Swiss legal practice, aligning it more closely with international standards and addressing long-standing concerns within the Swiss legal and corporate communities.

Legal Privilege in Switzerland

In Switzerland, attorney-client privilege operates similarly to that in many other civil and common law jurisdictions. An avocat or Rechtsanwalt—the Swiss equivalent of an attorney or barrister—is bound by a duty of strict confidentiality regarding all communications with clients, regardless of the medium. Breaches of this duty can result in civil, professional, and criminal sanctions.

A Swiss avocat may refuse to testify, provide evidence, or produce any documents that fall within the scope of this privilege.

Why Legal Privilege Has Not Applied to In-House Counsel

The reason lies in the regulatory structure governing the legal profession in Switzerland.

Practicing avocats in Switzerland must register with a State body that supervises those who represent multiple clients before courts and authorities. Typically, this body is the highest court of a canton, such as the Tribunal Cantonal in Vaud, the Commission du Barreau in Geneva, or the Zürcher Anwaltsverband in Zurich. However, when avocats transition to in-house roles, they must “leave the Bar,” effectively removing themselves from the list of practicing attorneys. Consequently, the legal protections afforded to practicing avocats no longer apply to them as in-house counsel.

This approach contrasts sharply with that of common law jurisdictions like the United States and the United Kingdom, where attorney-client privilege uniformly extends to all practicing attorneys, including those working in-house. In the U.S., for instance, all lawyers, regardless of their employment context, must be admitted to the Bar, and attorney-client privilege applies equally to in-house and external lawyers. The UK follows a similar approach.

In several civil law jurisdictions, such as France, Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands, in-house counsel receive varying degrees of legal privilege, particularly when the counsel holds a Bar-equivalent degree. However, the scope and consistency of these protections can vary.

Implications for Swiss-Based Companies

The absence of privilege protection for in-house counsel has been a significant concern for Swiss-based companies, particularly those involved in international litigation. Without such protection, companies face the risk of being compelled to disclose communications from their in-house counsel in cross-border disputes, especially in U.S. litigation. This exposure has placed Swiss companies at a disadvantage compared to their U.S. counterparts, who can withhold similar communications under the protection of legal privilege.

Introduction of Article 167a CPC

The new Article 167a of the CPC aims to address this gap by extending privilege to in-house counsel under specific conditions. According to Article 167a, paragraph 1, a party may refuse to cooperate and produce documents related to the activities of its in-house legal department if the following criteria are met:

  1. The party is registered as a legal entity in the Swiss commercial registry or an equivalent foreign registry.
  2. The head of the legal department holds a cantonal avocat degree or meets the professional requirements to practice as an attorney in their country of origin.
  3. The activity in question would be considered specific to the exercise of an avocat’s profession if carried out by an avocat.

The privilege also extends to non-lawyers working in the legal department, provided the department is led by an avocat or an equivalent attorney. However, this protection is limited to activities considered “specific to the exercise” of an avocat’s profession. Activities outside this scope, such as political, social, or commercial tasks, are not protected.

This limitation is expected to generate debate in certain cases. For example, if an in-house lawyer leads an internal compliance investigation, questions may arise as to whether this constitutes a typical legal activity and whether related communications should be protected. The reporting line of the lawyer—specifically whether the lawyer or the compliance department reports to the General Counsel—may be a key factor in such determinations.

Challenges and Enforceability

While the introduction of Article 167a is a positive step, its enforceability in international contexts, particularly in U.S. litigation, remains a subject of debate. The rules of evidence and discovery in U.S. Federal and State Courts differ significantly from those in Switzerland. However, U.S. courts may recognize the Swiss “brevet” (authorization to practice) as equivalent to a U.S. attorney’s license, thereby extending attorney-client privilege to “juristes” working under the supervision of an “avocat breveté” by analogy to the “agent or subordinate” of a U.S. attorney.

Conclusion

The revision represents a long-awaited advancement in protecting in-house counsel communications in Switzerland. While the practical enforcement of Article 167a will depend on judicial interpretation and case law, it is a crucial development for Swiss companies, offering them much-needed protection in an increasingly globalized legal environment.

New developments in international inheritance law

Status update with Anthony Braham.

Which Law Can a Will Be Subject to in Switzerland?

How Can Heirs Transfer Assets if They Are Located Abroad?

What Happens if a Will Is Subject to Foreign Law, but the Testator Was a Swiss Resident at the Time of Death?

These are just some of the questions that Switzerland’s Federal Act on Private International Law (LDIP) is meant to address. The chapter concerning succession law has been revised and was approved by the Swiss Parliament on December 22, 2023.

The revision has two main objectives:

  • To modernize Swiss international succession law, notably by codifying certain case law practices.
  • To align it with legal developments abroad, particularly following the adoption of EU Regulation No. 650/2012, which has been in effect since 2015 and introduced the European Certificate of Succession.

Additionally, the amendment aims to increase the autonomy of the parties involved and reduce the risk of jurisdictional conflicts between Swiss and foreign authorities, whether during the probate process (the issuance of the certificate of inheritance) or during the division of the estate and related legal disputes regarding the will or its provisions.

One of the key debates in Parliament focused on the choice of applicable law (professio juris).

Choosing the Applicable Law

Currently, a person living in Switzerland who holds both Swiss and foreign nationality cannot subject their will to foreign law. Swiss law necessarily applies.

However, it is common for expatriates who have lived in Switzerland for many years to acquire Swiss nationality. Under the current rule, if their will is subject to foreign law or references foreign legal concepts, it could be partially or entirely invalidated.

Greater Freedom to Choose, but with Limits

Initially, the draft law proposed by the Swiss Federal Council removed all restrictions, granting complete freedom to testators.

However, when Parliament reviewed the bill in the autumn of 2023, it determined that the concept of forced heirship is a fundamental principle of Swiss succession law.

As a result, the final version approved on December 22, 2023, while allowing foreign nationals who also hold Swiss nationality to choose a foreign law, introduced a limitation: a will subject to foreign law cannot override Swiss forced heirship rules.

Under Swiss law, forced heirs include a person’s descendants (children) and the surviving spouse. The reserved share depends on family composition but can account for up to 50% of the entire estate.

The new law will nonetheless allow the use of foreign legal concepts that are currently prohibited, such as the testamentary trust, a structure widely used in Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions for its advantages in asset independence and third-party management.

Expected Implementation in 2025

As of the date of this article, the Swiss Federal Council has not yet set the implementation date for the new Articles 51, 58, and 86 to 96 of the LDIP.

According to available information, the new provisions are expected to come into effect in 2025. This article will be updated as soon as the official date is announced.

Domicile in tax law

Current developments remind us that tax law has its own definition of domicile.
Status update with Christian Chillà.

According to Article 3 LIFD, individuals are subject to tax on a personal basis when, under tax law, they are domiciled or residing in Switzerland.

A person is considered domiciled in Switzerland for tax purposes if they reside there with the intent to establish permanent residence or have a special legal domicile under federal law.

A person is considered to be residing in Switzerland for tax purposes if, without significant interruption, they stay for at least 30 days while working or at least 90 days without engaging in gainful employment.

Those who maintain their domicile abroad but stay in Switzerland solely for education or medical treatment are neither domiciled nor resident for tax purposes.

The concept of tax domicile is crucial. If a person’s tax domicile is in Switzerland, they are generally subject to unlimited taxation on all income and, at the cantonal level, on their assets, regardless of the income source or asset location.

This constitutes worldwide taxation.

However, this taxation is limited internationally by double taxation agreements and at the cantonal level by inter-cantonal tax-sharing rules, particularly Article 6 LIFD and the constitutional prohibition on inter-cantonal double taxation (Article 127, paragraph 3 Cst.).

Initially, tax law referred to civil domicile to determine tax domicile. Since the introduction of the LIFD, this is no longer the case. However, in principle, tax domicile aligns with civil domicile.

Tax domicile is an autonomous concept, independent of civil law. A person can have a civil domicile in one place while having a tax domicile elsewhere.

Tax domicile is based on two elements:

  • Objective (residence): The physical presence of a person at a specific location.
  • Subjective (intention): The intention to make that place the center of their vital interests.

Residence is a factual element. The intention to settle is the subjective element. While permanent settlement is not required, the individual must intend to stay. What matters is not the person’s inner intent but the objectively recognizable circumstances that indicate this intention.

According to Federal Court jurisprudence on double taxation (Article 127, paragraph 3 Cst.), the tax domicile of an employed individual is at the place where they reside with the intent of permanent settlement, or where their primary personal interests lie. This is typically their place of employment if they work there daily for an extended or indefinite period to support themselves.

If a person alternates between two locations, particularly when their workplace differs from their habitual residence, their tax domicile is where they have the closest personal ties.

For commuters working in one canton but returning daily to their residence in another canton, the residence canton is the tax domicile.

Determining tax domicile requires assessing personal circumstances, such as professional, family, and social ties. The political domicile (where official documents are registered) is not decisive.

For married taxpayers, family ties take precedence over workplace ties. Thus, married individuals are usually taxed at their family residence. This applies even if one spouse commutes weekly to work (Wochenaufenthalter). However, for senior executives, the presumption is that their tax domicile is at their workplace unless they prove significant ties to the family residence.

The same principles apply to single, separated, or widowed taxpayers. However, family ties in such cases are assessed more strictly since they tend to be weaker than those between spouses.

When single taxpayers phase out employment for retirement, tax domicile is determined based on objective circumstances.

Regardless of marital status, there is a risk of multiple tax authorities (cantonal or international) claiming jurisdiction, requiring careful analysis by a specialist.